



Endocode AG

Why automation matters for security

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Regular changes from Dev to OPS and back
Big Data Architect


Secure Linux Administration Conference 2015

About Endocode

- Berlin based company: 14 people, 9 Nations
- Open Source Development and Dev Ops Projects
- Customers
 - Startups
 - Scaling
 - Automation
 - Big Customers building Deployment Pipelines
 - Open Invention Network
 - Free Software Foundation Europe
 - Prototype projects
 - Grundgrün
 - Secure Phone based on L4 and Android

Visit us on Github: github.com/endocode

Disclaimer: we work for CoreOs



Endocode does projects with Puppet, Chef, Amazon, Hadoop ...

Warning

this talk contains some

- uncomfortable truths
- heretic remarks
- offending pictures
- nerdy jokes

I apologize for possible bad taste and infringements


all examples are from real projects

customers have been anonymized to protect the innocent



How to run the whole system secure?

- is this possible?
- failure is not an option?
- How to get there?



- Highest Reputation?
- What are audits?
- audits check **exactly what is in the contract**
- mixture of usability, security and something
- like checking your car, your insurance and the color of the seats

What does an audit check?





System Audits

Roles: Auditor and Supporter

- Auditor controls you
- Supporter supports you

Approach corporate style

- good cop, bad cop
- bad cop, good cop



After the Audits

Recommended vendor firmware update
in a **certified** security critical environment:

```
http://linux.dell.com/repo/hardware/latest/bootstrap.cgi
```

proposes

```
Wget -q -O - http://linux.dell.com/repo/firmware/bootstrap.cgi | bash
```

No checking of addresses, certificates etc



Running a complete embedded monitoring systems

- VNC console
- Tomcat (ooooold)
- Updated with software from repository



BASF

EXTRA

5.25" · 2S/HD

96 tpi



Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard


- 1) Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data.
- 2) Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters.
- 3) Protect stored cardholder data.
- 4) Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks.
- 5) Use and regularly update antivirus software.
- 6) Develop and maintain secure systems and applications.
- 7) Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know.
- 8) Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access.
- 9) Restrict physical access to cardholder data.
- 10) Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data.
- 11) Regularly test security systems and processes.
- 12) Maintain a policy that addresses information security.

Don't be a complete idiot

what else: PCI DSS

- EMV (Europay, MasterCard, and Visa) is standard
- opening a 2nd location without notice
- we have errors, because of this 80 char string being encrypted

**Obvious solution:
turn on encryption for the audit,
turn off after the audit**



admins are trained for a wrong mindset


- fear
- lies
- fraud
- avoiding truth
- relax folks, we are safe, we have been audited*
- cynism
- burnout
- do you really have to work this way?

Conclusion on audits

- circumvented
 - obtained by fraud
 - basic policies
 - complex systems
-
- how worse it would be without audits?
 - not completely useless
 - no warranty

Questions
on audits?

?



Dimension of the problem


At least three dimensions

- Number of Systems
- Number of Applications
- Number of Updates

cubic growth

Growth models

Exponential (geometric) growth



- Linear
- Cubic
- Exponential


Regain control

- know what you are doing!
- automate
- KISS
- divide et impera
- separation of concerns

complexity of distributed systems

Monitoring

- monitor everything
- part of the deployment
- inversion of control



complexity of distributed systems

Know your complexity

- packages (deb and rpm)
- configuration (Cookbooks, recipes, manifests)
- orchestration (OpenStack, Homegrown)

**Everything can be
packaged:**

**configuration
passwords**

Sputnik

Immobilienscout24



Packages

- Red Hat, Debian: no support
- repackage everything via deps
- you started packaging your configuration
- and end creating a distro




Configuration Systems

Promise

- no manual configuration
- updates automatically
- runs permanently

Reality

- Part of the problem
- You need an Architect or an Exorcist
- Predictability
- Updates
- Fear!




Orchestration

Not yet ready??!!


OpenStack?





Tux
must
get
lean
again

!





What we really want

Unikernels


- MirageOS
- OCaml
- rewrite everything

Microservices

- containers
- immutable
- shrunk

CoreOS

- immutable
- runs containers
- tin cans



docker



by .

PETUNIA CONSCIOUSNESS ARTICULATION

"OH NO, NOT AGAIN"

ACCELERATION RATE: $22ZLS/XC/XC$

SPEED




95 ALTM/S



ATMOSPHERIC
RESISTANCE

15 ALTP/ALTM²

www.opencontainers.org



Containers?

needs some orchestration

- Fleet: systemd configuration
- Flannel: networking
- Etcd: configuration registry
- kubernetes: orchestration

systemd

- Systemd: inside and outside rkt containers
- requires access to external resources: disks, inter
- network
- storage



Optimized Containers

- stripped down to the bare necessities
- mostly stateless
- orchestration by Kubernetes



see

Jason Wilders Squashing Docker Images


<http://jasonwilder.com/blog/2014/08/19/squashing-docker-images/>




If you do not
want it

Fight!

- containers
- systemd
- CoreOS



Our
current
Starship





Thank you!
Questions!

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