

Post Mortem –

an Introduction to Filesystem Forensics and Data Recovery

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Overview

- What is **forensic analysis**?
- **layered model of information storage**
- **read-only** access and the problem of non-invasive **duplication**
- generic **file system model**
- **MS-DOS partition table structure**
- issues in **data recovery**
- **The Sleuthkit**
- **File Carving**

What This Talk is NOT About...

- data **encryption** and decryption / code breaking
- **steganography**
- forensics in a stricter sense: **legal issues**
 - evidence before court
 - data protection
 - ...
- **RAID/LVM reconstruction**

What is Forensic Analysis?

- **(side-channel) analysis of computer**
 - after security incident (e.g. intrusion attack)
 - for forensic purposes in a stricter sense (illegal material on hard disk etc.)
- needed for
 - **event reconstruction**
 - **data recovery**
 - **hidden data retrieval**

Live vs. Post-Mortem Analysis

live analysis


- applies to the **whole system** (disk, VM)
- mostly important after **intrusion alert**
- offers access to **volatile data** (RAM, temporary files, pseudo-files, kernel objects, process state)
- always **alters system state!**
- data **must not be trusted**, but may be the best one has

post-mortem analysis

- can only be applied to **persistent data storage**, most important: **file system analysis**
- especially important for **data recovery** and **hidden data retrieval**
- in most cases **side-channel analysis** (live system + special analysis tools)
- in a less strict sense: **does not alter the state** of the file system


Layers of Information Storage: Overview

- **lower layers:**
 - information becomes less and less meaningful
- **higher layers:**
 - information becomes more **meaningful**
 - ordering of information creates **slack space**



Layers of Information Storage: Reconstructing the Layers 1


- 1:1 duplication not possible
- read-only access not possible
- most parts undocumented:
 - firmware features
 - undocumented ATA commands
 - jumper settings
 - access to lower sector layers
 - bad sector access
 - unused sector access
- disk surface analysis requires **special devices (MFM)**



Layers of Information Storage: Reconstructing the Layers 2


- **ATA features:**

- Host-Protected Area (HPA)
`hdparm -N ...`
- Device Configuration Overlay (DCO)
- Security Password
- On-Disk Encryption
- HDAT2: <http://www.hdat2.com/>




Layers of Information Storage: Reconstructing the Layers 3

- meant to host file system, swap space, raw database storage
- partitions
- software RAID devices:
 - MD driver
 - LVM(2)
 - EVMS
 - Microsoft LDM
 - ...




Layers of Information Storage: Reconstructing the Layers 4

- **primary user interface** for information access
- most complex layer
- many **ambiguities** with systematic analysis




Layers of Information Storage: Reconstructing the Layers 5

- user application-specific format



Slack Space and Hidden Data Retrieval

- **slack space**: unused but allocated area
- may contain **hidden** or **supposedly deleted data**
- to extract content of slack space, **lower-level** data must be copied
- or **(undocumented) APIs** can be used



The Problem of Non-Invasive Duplication (I)

- **duplication** must be done on **layer 1**
 - lower levels: **no full access**
 - higher levels: **loss of slack space**
- Linux problem:
 - block devices must have **even number of sectors** (last uneven sector is truncated)

		read-only access possible?
Layer 4	file	yes
Layer 3	file system	yes BUT: r/o mount changes journal!
Layer 2	volume	yes BUT: standard assembly changes metadata!
Layer 1	disk block device	yes
Layer 0	hard disk	no: defect management S.M.A.R.T.

The Problem of Non-Invasive Duplication (II)

- **primary tool of choice: dd**
 - good review of caveats: <http://www.softpanorama.org/Tools/dd.shtml>
- **alternatives:**
 - **ddrescue** (<http://www.gnu.org/software/ddrescue/ddrescue.html>)
dd_rescue (<http://www.garloff.de/kurt/linux/ddrescue/>)
 - different syntax!
 - status output
 - can read backwards
 - **dcldd** (<http://dcldd.sourceforge.net>)
 - computes hash values of parts of stream
 - status output
 - **dccidd** ([email:dcci@dc3.gov](mailto:dcci@dc3.gov))
 - parallel development of dcldd
 - NIST test report: <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/220223.pdf>

The Problem of Non-Invasive Duplication (III)

- **live systems** (Knoppix, B.O.S.S.) must be booted with „noswap“ option
- imaging examples:

- netcat example:


```
slave% nc -l -p 9000 | dd of=/var/tmp/image_of_sda1  
master% dd if=/dev/sda | nc <slave IP address> 9000
```

- byte swapping with remote access of SGI magnetic tape:

```
rsh sgi.with.tape dd bs=256b if=/dev/rmt0 conv=swab \  
| tar xvf -
```


A Generic File System Model

- **essential** vs. **inessential** data:
 - essential for **data recovery**: file system category, block or extent pointers
 - inessential: remainder, but: is necessary for forensics in stricter sense (e.g. event analysis of hacker attack)





Typical File System Layout (I): Berkeley FFS Heritage

- fixed locations for inode table and block bitmap
- static inode size + fixed-size inode table
- no tree structures, many unordered lists
- block oriented, no extent addressing
- block groups (aka „cylinder groups“) very small ($8 * \text{blocksize}$)





Typical File System Layout (II): XFS, JFS(2), ReiserFS, Ext4

- no fixed locations for inode and block allocation table
- static inode size, but dynamic inode allocation table
- many B⁺ tree structures
- extent addressing (w.exc.of ReiserFS)
- large allocation groups (many Gb in size)



Typical File System Layout (III): NTFS


- „everything is a file“ throughout
- all data is of „attribute ↔ value“ form:
 - file name
 - metadata
 - data streams
 - allocation lists
- Master File Table (MFT) is central administrative structure for FS




Typical File System Layout (IV): FAT

- simple layout
- (nearly) no features
- FAT12,16,32 according to FAT entry size
- no clear distinction between categories:
 - FAT belongs to file system category AND metadata category
 - directory entry belongs to file name category AND metadata category


FAT12/16



FAT32




directory entry



The MS-DOS Partition Table Structure

- **mmls** shows more detailed output



Data Recovery Examples (I): Lost Partition Table

- Platte /dev/hdb: 20.4 GByte, 20491075584 Byte
16 Köpfe, 63 Sektoren/Spuren, 39704 Zylinder, total 40021632 sectors
Einheiten = Sektoren von 1 * 512 = 512 Bytes

Gerät	Boot	Start	End	Blocks	Id	System
/dev/hdb1		63	10079999	5039968+	83	Linux
/dev/hdb2		10080000	30239999	10080000	5	Erweiterte
/dev/hdb4		30240000	40021631	4890816	83	Linux
/dev/hdb5		10080063	15119999	2519968+	83	Linux
/dev/hdb6		15120063	20159999	2519968+	83	Linux
/dev/hdb7		20160063	25199999	2519968+	83	Linux
/dev/hdb8		25200063	30239999	2519968+	83	Linux

Data Recovery Examples (I): Lost Partition Table

- **gpart** (<http://www.stud.uni-hannover.de/user/76201/gpart/>) can recover lost partition tables:
`gpart /dev/hda`
`gpart -w /dev/sdc /dev/sdc`
- in case of lost MBR: extended partition table most probably intact, but at unknown location
- **sigfind** can scan sectors for signatures:
`sigfind -o 510 -l AA55 disk.dd`
 - many false hits: MS-DOS partition tables, FAT32 FSINFO sector have same signature
- **disktype** (<http://disktype.sourceforge.net>) can identify volume and fs types

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/dev/hdb6		15120063	20159999	2519968+	83	Linux
/dev/hdb7		20160063	25199999	2519968+	83	Linux
/dev/hdb8		25200063	30239999	2519968+	83	Linux



- hdb4 not found, because file system was missing
- partition types based on heuristics and may be false

Data Recovery Examples (II): Deleted File on FAT FS

- file deletion:
 - directory entry is de-allocated but not wiped
 - FAT entries are set to 0
 - directory entries are likely to be more fragmented (allocation-on-demand)

→ leads to **ambiguities**:


- starting location is known (via directory entry)
- consider only unallocated sectors (otherwise inconsistent fs!)



- A: correct recovery
- B: correct recovery
- C: incorrect recovery


Data Recovery Examples (III): Metadata Ambiguities 1

1. file A with inode #100 allocates block 1000
2. file A is deleted, inode #100 and block 1000 de-allocated
3. file B with inode #200 is created and allocates block 1000
4. file B is deleted, inode #200 and block 1000 de-allocated
→ which inode does block 1000 belong to?




Data Recovery Examples (III): Metadata Ambiguities 2

1. file C with inode #300 is created and allocates block 1000
2. file C is deleted, inode #300 and block 1000 de-allocated
3. file D with inode #300 is created and allocates block 2000
→ no trace whatsoever that block 1000 is content of previously „wiped“ inode 300!








Data Recovery Examples (IV): Filename Ambiguities 1

1. file1.dat with inode #100 allocates block 1000
2. file1.dat is deleted, direntry, inode #100 and block 1000 de-allocated
3. file2.dat with inode #100 is created and allocates block 1000
4. file2.dat is deleted, direntry, inode #100 and block 1000 de-allocated
→ which is the correct filename for inode #100 and content 1000?



Data Recovery Examples (IV): Filename Ambiguities 2



The Sleuthkit I

- „The Sleuthkit“ (<http://www.sleuthkit.org>) by Brian Carrier is successor to „The Coroner's Toolkit“ by Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema
- forensic tool collection (over 20 command line utilities), plus „Autopsy“ as graphical front-end exists
- disk tools: **diskstat**, **disk_sreset**
- image tools: **img_stat**
- volume tools: **mmls**

The Sleuthkit II

- **file system tools:**
 - file system category: **fsstat**
 - metadata category: **icat**, **ifind**, **ils**, **istat**
 - file name category: **ffind**, **fls**, **fstat**
 - content category: **dcalc**, **dcat**, **dls**, **dstat**
 - application category: **jcat**, **jls**
- **graphical front-end: autopsy**
 - automates some analysis and recovery steps
 - multi-user capable
 - case management

The Sleuthkit III

- copy the slack space of an image:
`dd -s -f ntfs -v <path-to-image>`
- list content (including deleted entries) of directory with inode 69457:
`fls -f linux-ext3 <path-to-image> 69457`

Data Carving

- when systematic analysis overwhelms you:
 - semantical carving tools work directly on volume layer (ignore any filesystem structure)
 - “foremost”: (<http://foremost.sourceforge.net>):
foremost -vd <path-to-image-file>
 - “scalpel”: <http://www.digitalforensicsolutions.com/Scalpel>
 - carvfs/OCFA does inline carving:
<http://sourceforge.net/projects/ocfa>
<http://ocfa.sourceforge.net>

Further Reading

- Brian Carrier: „*File System Forensic Analysis*“; Addison-Wesley 2005.
(must-have)
- Oliver Tennert: „In letzter Minute“ Post-mortem-Analyse von Filesystemen unter Linux. *iX* 03/2006, S. 38-44.
- Oliver Tennert: „Eine fremde Welt“ Zugriff auf das Windows-Dateisystem NTFS unter Linux. *Linux-Magazin* 11/2006, S. 84-91.
- Stefan Kelm: „Rausgefischt“ Daten wiederherstellen mit Open-Source-Tools. *iX* 05/2008, S. 56-60.
- **Themen-Special:** *Linux-Magazin* 06/2008.